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Many systems are hacked daily and apparently without
much effort (e.g., see [1]). This happens because hackers prefer
not to break security mechanisms immediately, but rather to
target unguarded components first. Such components, e.g.,
users and human-computer ceremonies [2], are hacked by
exploiting cognitive features (e.g., trust) and people’s dismay
with ill-designed interfaces. These user-related components are
often ignored in traditional security analysis. Thus, it should
not surprise that systems proved secure may fail especially
when they run in different contexts from those wherein they
have been proven secure.
We are interested to define a framework where to model
and analyse a system’s social and technical components. We
describe here a variant of Bella et al.’s model [3]. Therein
Alice and Bob are not metaphors for communicating processes,
but personae linked a set of interaction layers (see Fig. 1
and its caption) that connect humans and computers and, via
the network, them with other computers and users. On top
of this model we define an intruder. It controls the network,
as in classical Dolev-Yao [4], and also the application, the
user interfaces, and the context. When using its full power the
intruder can influence the components and the user behaviour,
and so security depends on what happens across all layers:
the analysis of security results richer, and we talk of socio-
technical security analysis.
Studying socio-technical security compels us to revise tra-
ditional analysis techniques. Depending on the focus of the
analysis, in fact, we may need different methodologies and
tools. An analysis focusing more on the technical side (com-
municating processes, applications and interfaces) and with at-
tackers controlling the networks and/or the interfaces, requires
tools to reason about the behaviour of software components.
An analysis addressing more the social side (persona and
user behaviour) requires to observe and reason about users
interacting with the system, so a research methodology proper
of social and cognitive sciences.
In the sequel, we comment on methodologies and tools
that we evaluated and selected in two experiments concern-
ing socio-technical understanding of the security of TLS
certificate validation. We have successfully applied formal
methods (model checking) when considering layers “network”
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Fig. 1. The multi-layered security and threat model. Alice’s side is in
grey: SA is Alice’s self, that contextualises in Alice’s persona in a specific
context, PA. UIA is the user-interface she uses to interact with the networked
application pA. It runs a protocol with pB , an element of Bob’s side, here
not fully shown. Arrows are possible attacks. The intruder can control context,
interaction, events between application and user interface, and the network.
and “computer” (cf. Figure 1), and when assuming users
behave non-deterministically (Sect I). This confirms Martina
and Carlos’s saying that formal methods are useful to analyse
security ceremonies [5]. To study instead security with more
realistic user models we had to look into research methods
of human-computer interaction (HCI) and cognitive science
practices; because there is no framework for security analysis
in those practises, we had to define one of our own (Sect II).
I. EXPERIMENT 1 - TLS CERTIFICATE VALIDATION
Authentication of a web server relies on TLS certificates,
and it succeeds if the browser validates the server’s TLS
certificate. But, if the browser can not validate the certificate
–e.g., because this is self-signed by the server and not by a
trusted authority– authentication may depend on the user: often
browsers let him to decide whether to proceed or abort the
session. Thus, TLS certificate validation is a socio-technical
procedure made of communicating processes (the browser
engine and the server), user interfaces (the browser’s window
and the options offered thereon), and a persona (the user).
In this experiment we studied the security of TLS certificate
validation for four of the most popular browsers: Chrome,
Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Opera Mini. We modelled the
browsers, their interfaces and a simple model of user that
chooses, non-deterministically, among the options offered him
by the browser. Browsers run different engines and ceremonies
with users, so the analysis –whose focus is on the structure of
the dialogue browser-user– is rich in possibilities.
We explored methodologies and tools to carry on our
analysis. To model all the layers involved in TLS certificate
validation, we first tried different graphic formalisms, like
cognitive walk-through and flow charts, but their lacking a
formal semantics precludes any formal analysis. Eventually,
we chose UML activity diagrams. The contribution of UML
activity diagrams is threefold. First, they fit with the layered
representation of the ceremony. Second, they give immediately
an easy reading of TLS sessions; in fact, a quick glance at
the diagrams of the browsers under study shows clearly their
different validation mechanisms. Third, despite having a semi-
formal semantics it is not difficult to translate them in a formal
language. A prototyped tool that translates UML activity
diagrams in CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes) [6]
will be available soon [7].
To carry on a formal analysis, we translated the UML
diagrams in CSP#, which is a richer language based on CSP.
We also modelled an intruder, here a Dolev-Yao controlling
the network (the large arrow on the right in Fig. 1), and
the user. Capturing the complexities of user behaviour by a
formal model is a challenging open issue. As explained in
the introduction, we modelled the user as a non-deterministic
process: this is the weaker assumption about the user skills:
2a ceremony that is secure for a non-deterministic user, is also
secure for any user.
The last step of our prototype methodology consisted in
defining relevant security properties. We identified four socio-
technical properties that bind TLS session, validation mecha-
nisms, and user choices. We expressed them in linear temporal
logic. One property is meant to evaluate the user involvement:
it assesses whether the browser always warns the user when
certificate validation fails. Two properties aim to evaluate
whether the mechanisms that browsers adopt to manage failed
certificate validations protect user from man-in-the-middle
(MIM) attacks (e.g., if they avoid that he proceeds accessing
a page controlled by the intruder). The last property is about
informing the user that a MIM attack might have occurred in
previous TLS sessions.
We verified the properties with the PAT (Process Analysis
Toolkit) model checker [8]. The most interesting results regard
Firefox. PAT reports a trace showing that Firefox does not
warn the user when a certificate validation fails. This is due to
the drawbacks of storing server certificates permanently, which
Firefox allows its users to do. Moreover, it is worth noting that
no browser keeps records of past warnings, exposing users to
vulnerabilities when they bootstrap with MIM. This finding
suggests a novel, more secure, strategy for browsers.
II. EXPERIMENT 2 - HUMAN BEHAVIOURAL MODEL
This second experiment is about on-going work. Building
a more realistic user behaviour requires tools and research
methods commonly employed in experimental psychology like
surveys, diaries, focus-groups, interviews or non-interfering
observations in a laboratory setting. Those tools allow us
to build behavioural patterns by studying quantitative and
qualitative aspects of the human behaviour in a scenario with
socio-technical attacks. We adopt our multi-layered security
Fig. 2. HCI Research Methods, with Socio-Technical Analysis framework.
and threat model and we assume that socio-technical attacks
may strike as indicated in Fig. 1. To study how users behave
therein, we use the traditional HCI’s hypothetical-deductive
research process that we have re-adapted to our needs (see
Fig. 2). The process starts with us stating hypothesis (research
questions) about an attack, defence(s), user, application, and
context. One problem we met is that there is no work-flow
helping us to design and implement laboratory experiments
that stress hypothesis of this kind: we have to design one.
Starting from the multi-layered security and threat model, we
identified key components in User, Application and Context
(basic components) to which we added Attack and Defence.
All those elements but Defence are mapped to elements of our
multi-layered model in Fig. 1. Attack and defence may com-
pete: the former pushing users to an insecure behaviour, the
latter, if present, to a secure behaviour. What secure/insecure
behaviour mean, is defined in the methodology.
Every component has a state and acts with input/output
actions according to a Behaviour Control Process (BCP). The
state, like the BCP, can be very complex and we may not
be able to formalize it fully. For instance, a browser has its
code as BCP (as seen in Section I) but we do not have such
things for the user. However, we can inquire properties of that
behaviour by observing it during the laboratory experiment.
For instance if the user reads some information on a website
we know that he inputs something, but we do not know if he
has learnt something until we observe his following actions.
We now apply this framework to the TLS certification
verification. We know that users already ignore 60% of In-
terstitial Warnings (IW) in Google Chrome [9] and this rate
may increase if an Attack changes the user’s “state” just before
he makes a choice. An Attack controlling the user interface,
for example a browser-in-the middle (the big arrow on the left
in Fig. 1), can add a Fake IW before the genuine warning to
misled the user in interpreting self-signed certificate as SELF-
signed certificate, that is “certificated signed by SELF”, where
SELF is the name of a certification authority yet unknown by
the user’s browser, but introducing itself as trusted in the text
of the IW. This introduces a polysemy on the word “self”
that may lead the user to misinterpret the meaning of the
word (called equivocation fallacy). To test whether people’s
knowledge of TLS certificates is robust enough to resist such
misleading inputs we need to instantiate our framework (i.e.,
to decide how to launch the attack, what and how to observe,
what to ask users afterwards, etc.)
Further experiments are needed to observe the patterns that
lead users to fail or to resist the attack. This is future work
that we plan to do in the EMACS usability laboratory.
III. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We presented a framework where to analyse socio-technical
security of systems, and we commented on methodologies that,
in our experience, are apt for this analysis. However, we need
to test our framework with more use scenarios.
We thank G. Bella, and V. Koenig for their help with the
experiments herein described.
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